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the compelled execution of consent forms
authorizing foreign banks to disclose
records of the defendant's accounts did not
infringe upon the fifth amendment privilege, because neither the consent form nor
its execution communicated any factual
assertion. The Court explained that "to be
testimonial, an accused's communication
must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate
an actual assertion or disclose information
[because] [o]nly then is a person compelled
to be a 'witness' against himself." fd.
Similarly, in United States v. Campos·
Serrano, 430 F .2d 173 (7th Cir. 1970), the
court found a violation of the fifth amendment priv~lege when a defendant was
coerced into producing a forged alien registration card. The court ruled that, in prcr
ducing the card, the defendant implicitly
admitted the existence, location and control over the card and so was "compelled
to produce the crime itself." fd. at 176.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized, in the case sub judice, that Bouknight had a reasonable apprehension of
prosecution if, in accordance with the
court's order, she produced Maurice or
revealed his whereabouts, and the information disclosed that the child had suffered
further abuse or was even dead. If a crime
has been committed upon Maurice's person, Bouknight, by disclosing the demanded information, would be incriminating
herself. The court ruled that such communication, whether in the form of the compelled act of production or verbal
disclosure, is implicitly a testimonial communication and so falls within the contemplation of the fifth amendment privilege.
The court also addressed the State's argument that Bouknight waived her fifth
amendment privileges when she told the
court that Maurice was in Texas. The
court noted that Bouknight was not a
witness when she imparted this information, nor was she under oath, and the inaccurate information she revealed was not
directly incriminating. Thus, the court
ruled that Bouknight's fifth amendment
privilege remained intact.
The State's alternative contention that
the public right to protect its children, as
manifested by the Juvenile Causes Act,
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§
3-801-3-836 (1984), outweighs Bouknight's fifth amendment privilege was
rejected by the court. Although the court
recognized the validity of the State's argument that applying the constraints of the
fifth amendment in cases of child abuse
would afford a parent "carte blanche to
conceal any negative information about
the child's status and thereby strip the
Juvenile Court of its ability to protect
children suspected of being abused," it

held that case law does not favor statutory
requirements over constitutional protection when there is a strong possibility of
incrimination. Maurice M. at 408, 550 A.2d
at 1143. Under the circumstances of this
case, where the risk to Bouknight of prosecution is so substantial, the court could not
totally expunge Bouknight's fifth amendment rights. Thus, the court vacated the
civil contempt order.
In a strong dissent, Judge McAuliffe
stated that by producing Maurice, Bouknight would implicitly admit that 1) the
child is Maurice, and that 2) she has sufficient control and dominion over the child
to produce him. Although these facts
might be used against Bouknight in a
criminal prosecution, Judge McAuliffe
argued that communications which can be
classified as foregone conclusions or as selfevident information are of minimal testimonial significance, and consequently
should not be afforded fifth amendment
protection. Since Maurice could be identified solely by the scope of his injuries, and
since evidence of who had control and
dominion over the child furnishes no evidence of who had control over him at the
time of his injuries, no significant evidence
which merits fifth amendment protection
can be gleaned from the production of
Maurice.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
vacated a civil contempt order of the
Juvenile Court by which a mother
suspected of child abuse was directed to
produce the juvenile before the court or
disclose his whereabouts. Under the circumstances of the case, the court decided
that the mother's act of producing the
child had testimonial implications that
could incriminate her in the event of a
criminal prosecution. Thus, the mother's
claim of privilege under the fifth amendment was upheld.

- Mary fo Murphy
Richmond v. Croson Co.: SUPREME
COURT INVALIDATES SET-ASIDE
PLAN DESIGNED TO PROVIDE
JOBS FOR MINORITIES
The United States Supreme Court struck
down a city ordinance that channeled 30%
of public funds to minority-owned construction companies because it violated the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause. Richmond v. Croson Co. 57
U.S.L.W. 4132 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1989). For
the first time, a majority of the Court has
adopted strict scrutiny as the standard for
equal protection review of race-conscious
legislation.
The Richmond City Council adopted

the Minority Business Utilization Plan
("the Plan"), a minority set-aside program
that required prime contractors of city
construction projects to subcontract at
least 30% of the dollar amount of the contract to Minority Business Enterprises
(MBEs). The Plan was modeled after the
congressional program in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), which was
held constitutional. The Plan's propon.ents
claimed, inter alia, that although Richmond's general population was 50% black,
only .67% of the city's prime construction
contracts had been awarded to MBEs in a
five-year period. Thus, the plan was
declared "remedial."
A facial challenge to the ordinance was
brought in 1983 by J .A. Croson Co.
("Croson"), a white-owned plumbing
company which lost a $126,000 contract to
provide plumbing fixtures for the city jail.
Croson, the sole bidder on the project,
tried to comply with the set-aside requirement but was unable to obtain any MBEs
to subcontract for the job. Croson sought
waiver of the set-aside requirement, indicating that the MBEs contacted were either
unqualified, unresponsive, or unable to
quote a bid. fd at 4436. Richmond denied
Croson's request and decided to rebid the
project. fd.
Because the Plan was patterned after the
program in Fullilove, both the federal district court and the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit relied on the Fullilove
precedent and upheld the Plan. Croson
sought certiorari; the Supreme Court
vacated the court of appeal's decision and
remanded the case in light of Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267
(1986). On remand, the court of appeals
struck down the Plan because it violated
both prongs of strict scrutiny under the
equal protection clause.
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that strict scrutiny was
the proper standard of review, and that the
Plan failed both prongs of that test: (1) that
the state had a compelling interest; and (2)
that its Plan was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. As to the first prong of
the test, the Court held that the city failed
to "demonstrate a compelling interest in
apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race" because it
adduced no evidence of "any identified discrimination in the Richmond construction
industry." Croson at 4142. Although Richmond argued that it was attempting to
remedy various forms of past discrimination, it did not offer specific acts of discrimination, but rather it relied on general
assertions of past discrimination coupled
with the similar inference drawn from
various statistical disparities. Richmond
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relied on much of the same evidence found
in Fullilow, congressional investigations of
nationwide discrimination in the industry,
as well as its own evidence of discrimination in the local industry. The Court,
however, dismissed the congressional evidence as irrelevant, and deemed the local
evidence nonspecific and of limited probative value in establishing identified dis-cnmmation which would warrant
remedial action. Such "a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry provides no
guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it
seeks to remedy," and is too amorphous to
support an unyielding racial quota. Id. at
4140. The Court conceded that "[w]hile
there is no doubt that the sorry history
of. .. discrimination in this country contributed to a lack of opportunities for
black entrepreneurs, this observation,
standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial
quota in the awarding of public contracts
in Richmond, Virginia." Id.
Similarly, the statistical disparity
between the number of prime contracts
awarded to minority firms and the minority population of Richmond was deemed to
be misplaced, because the statistic did not
identify any specific discrimination. The
Court found it factually significant that
the city did not even "know how many
MBEs in the relevant market were qualified to undertake prime or subcontracting
work in public construction projects." Id.
at 4141.
The mere fact that black membership in these trade organizations is
low, standing alone, cannot establish a
prima facie case of discrimination ... If
the statistical disparity between eligible MBEs and MBE membership were
great enough, an inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise. In such a
case, the city would have a compelling
interest in preventing its tax dollars
from assisting these organizations in
maintaining a racially segregated construction market.
Id. Thus, Richmond had to identify specific discrimination before it enacted a raceconscious remedy. Although Congress had
not identified specific discrimination in
FullilO'lle, that program was valid because
section five of the fourteenth amendment
broadened Congress' powers to deal with
such discrimination. Id. at 4142. States,
however, were held to a stricter standard
of identifying a specifu: discrimination
before remedial measures could be taken.
Id. Because Richmond did not identify a
specific act of past discrimination, it failed
to establish a compelling interest for its
Plan.
The Plan failed the second prong of the

test because it was not narrowly tailored to
remedy the effects of specific past discrimination: "The gross overinclusiveness of
[the Plan] strongly impugns the city's
claim of residential motivation." Id. Since
the Plan was "not linked to identified dis-crimination in any way," the Court could
not assess whether it was "narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination." Id.
The Court noted an absence of any raceneutral means to increase minority participation in city contracting. It suggested that
a "race-neutral program of city financing
for small firms would, a fortiori, lead to
greater minority participation." Id. The
Court also deemed it significant that there
was an absence of any evidence that Richmond had considered any alternatives to a
race-based quota.
Moreover, the Court held that the 30%
quota was not "narrowly tailored to any
goal, except outright racial balancing." Id.
It reasoned that "[s]ince the city must
already consider bids on a case-by-case
basis, it is difficult to see the need for a
rigid numerical quota." Id. at 4143. Furthermore, the Plan was distinguished from
the scheme in Fullilove because that program provided waiver of the set-aside provisions where an MBE's higher price was
not attributable to the effects of past dis-crimination. The Croson court viewed the
quota system as an attempt by Richmond
to avoid the "bureaucratic effort necessary
to tailor remedial relief to those who truly
have suffered the effects of prior discrimination [and] cannot justify a rigid line
drawn on the basis of a suspect classification." Id. Finally, the Plan was overbroad
because it included such racial groups as
Indians, Orientals and Eskimos, against
whom there was no evidence of discrimination. Consequently, the Plan's 30%
quota could not realistically be tied to any
injury suffered by anyone and was
overinclusive.
A plurality of the Court distinguished
Croson from FullilO'lle because Congress
passed the legislation in FullilO'lle. Citing
FulliiO'lle, the Court held that section five
of the fourteenth amendment gave Congress unique and broad remedial powers.
Id. at 4139. Congress did not have to demonstrate any specific prior discriminationas required by states-in order to pass such
legislation. The Court expounded that
Congress enforces the fourteenth amendment and it has "the power to define situations which Congress determines threaten
principles of equality and to adopt
rules ... to deal with those situations." Id.
at 4138. Claiming that the Civil War
amendments "worked a dramatic change
in the balance between congressional and
state power over matters of race," the
Court emphasized that the fourteenth
amendment was actually intended to limit

the powers of states and enlarge the
powers of Congress. "That Congress may
identify and redress the effects of societywide discrimination does not mean
that ... the States ... are free to decide that
such remedies are appropriate." Id.
The Court conceded that the state had
the "authority to eradicate the effects of
private discrimination within its own legis-lative jurisdiction," but that this right
must be "exercised within the constraints
of §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,"
which required Richmond to identify specific discrimination before it could enact
remedial relief. Id. at 4138. The Court
noted that the rights created by section
one of the fourteenth amendment were
guaranteed to the individual and the rights
established are personal rights. Id. at 413839 (citing Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,22
(1948)). The Richmond plan breached
those "personal rights" because it denied
"certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fIXed percentage of public contracts, based solely upon their race." Id. at
4139. Strict scrutiny was, therefore, neces-sary to determine which classifications
were "benign" or "remedial," or which
classifications were motivated by illegitimate prejudices of race. "The test also
ensures that the means chosen "fit" the
compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the
classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." Id.
Thus, if Richmond had evidence that
non-minority contractors were discriminating against minority businesses, it could
eradicate that discrimination. Even if Richmond could demonstrate a significant statistical disparity between the "number of
qualified MBEs and the number of MBEs
actually hired by the locality's prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory
exclusion could arise." Id. at 4143. In such
circumstances, the "city could dismantle
the closed business system by taking
appropriate measures against those who
discriminate on the basis of race." Id. "In
the extreme case, some form of narrowly
tailored racial preference might be neces-sary to break down patterns of deliberate
exclusion." Id.
In a cogent dissent, Justice Marshall
claimed the Court had imposed a "daunting standard" that would discourage states
from "contemplating the use of raceconscious measures to eradicate the pres-ent effects of past discrimination." Id. at
4156. The result of which "marks a deliberate and giant step backward in this
Court's affirmative action jurisprudence."
Id. at 4149. Justice Marshall accused the
Court of trivializing Richmond's evidence
by examining it piecemeal, and not in the
context of the national pattern of discrimination revealed by Congress in Ful/ilO'lle.
Unable to distinguish Croson from Fulli·
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love, Justice Marshall asserted a less stringent test for race-based legislation: (1) that
remedial goals must serve important governmental objectives; (2) and must be
substantially related to the attainment of
those goals. Id. at 4150. Justice Marshall
discerned two of Richmond's remedial
goals: to eradicate the effects of past racial
discrimination, and to refrain from perpetuating the effects of that discrimination.
Id. at 4150-51. This discrimination was
based on a "varied body of evidence." Id.
at 4152. A national pattern of discrimination had been set, from which Richmond
did not deviate. Set in this context, Justice
Marshall argued "Richmond's reliance on
localized, industry-specific findings is a far
cry from the reliance on generalized
'societal discrimination' which the majority decries as a basis for remedial action."
Id. He accused the majority of disingenuinely "disaggregating Richmond's local
evidence, attacking it piecemeal, and thereby conclude that no single piece of evidence ... standing alone ... suffices to prove
past discrimination." Id. at 4153. Justice
Marshall concluded that the fourteenth
amendment did not impose "such onerous
[evidentiary] obligations upon states ...
once the reality of past discrimination is
apparent." Id. at 4154.
Secondly, the Plan was valid because "it
is substantially related to the interests it
seeks to serve in remedying past discrimination .... " Id. at 4145. He pointed out
that the majority overlooked the fact that
Richmond had a previous antidiscrimination statute and race-neutral legislation
that had virtually no effect on the eradication of the past discrimination. As to the
majority's claim that the 30% target could
not be narrowly tailored to any state goal,
he proclaimed that the Court ignored the
fact that the 30% figure was patterned
directly on the Fullilove precedent.
Justice Marshall concluded by denouncing the majority's adoption of the strict
scrutiny standard for review of raceconscious remedial measures. He argued
that remedial classifications warranted a
different standard of review from "brute
and repugnant state-sponsored racism"
and that the Court's holding indicated
"that it regards racism as a phenomenon of
the past." Id. at 4155.
The Court has adopted the rigid standard of strict scrutiny as the standard of
review for benign and remedial discrimination measures. The Court's holding
expressed that laws favoring blacks over
whites must be judged by the same constitutional standard as laws favoring whites
over blacks. The result could be the undoing of many affirmative action programs
nationwide, and will serve to discourage
the enactment of future affirmative action

legislation.

- Peter T. McDowell
McAvoy v. State: A SUSPECT
STOPPED FOR DRIVING WHILE
INTOXICATED IS NOT ENTIUED
TO MIRANDA ADVICE PRIOR TO
A FIELD OR CHEMICAL SOBRIETY

TEST.
A suspect who has been detained on suspicion of driving while intoxicated is not
entitled to Miranda advice before being
asked to perform field or chemical sobriety tests according to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland. McAvoy v. State, 314 Md.
509,551 A.2d 875 (1989). In so doing, the
court of appeals upheld the decisions of
both the lower court and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
Joseph McAvoy was stopped by police
for failing to obey a sign which prohibited
right turns on a red light. After McAvoy
was stopped, the officer and McAvoy
engaged in a discussion over whether such
a sign existed. To resolve the dispute, both
men returned to the intersection where the
alleged infraction occurred. While there,
they confirmed the existence of the sign in
question, and at that point the officer then
recognized signs of intoxication on
McAvoy. As a result, the officer requested
McAvoy to perform various field sobriety
tests. McAvoy failed the tests and was
arrested for driving while intoxicated.
Shortly after the arrest, McAvoy was
read a standard form DR-15, Advice of
Rights to a Chemical Test. This form
advised him of rights and obligations
under Maryland's implied consent law
(Maryland Transp. Code Ann. § 16-205.1),
but did not advise him of his right to counsel. McAvoy elected to take a breathalyzer
test, which determined that he had .20 percent by weight of alcohol in his blood.
After the test, McAvoy was arrested for
driving under the influence and advised of
his Miranda rights. At trial McAvoy contended that the evidence produced from
these tests was obtained by custodial interrogation and therefore not admissible
without a prior Miranda warning.
A custodial interrogation is defined in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
at 444. To counter the "inherently compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation, the Supreme Court in Miranda held
that a suspect in custody must be advised
of certain constitutional rights and may
only then voluntarily waive them if he so
chooses. Id. at 467.

McAvoy argued, and the court rejected,
that at the time of the field sobriety test he
was in custody. Even though the officer
invited McAvoy to return to the scene of
the infraction, and even though he had
subjectively decided to detain McAvoy
when he detected his intoxication, the
court held that neither element was
enough to elicit a custodial interrogation
under Miranda.
In further support of its position that
McAvoy was not in custody, the court of
appeals examined Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420 (1984). The Supreme Court
held that a temporary detention in connection with an ordinary traffic stop would
not constitute custody in order to require
Miranda advice. To remain temporary the
stop must be brief, in a public place and
the suspect must not be told that the stop
would not be brief. Accordingly, a formal
arrest would not result under Berkemer if
"[a] single police officer asked a respondent a modest number of questions and
requested him to perform a simple balancing test at a location visible to passing
motorists." McAvoy, 314 Md. at 516, 551
A.2d at 878 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at
434). Therefore, since McAvoy was stopped in a public place, never told that his
detention would not be brief, and the stop
was in fact brief, he was not in custody
according to Berkemer and the court of
appeals. Furtheql1ore, during the stop, the
officer only asked McAvoy to perform
some field tests and did not interrogate
him in any manner. McAvoy, 314 Md. at
517, 551 A.2d at 879.
After completion of the field sobriety
test, however, McAvoy was formally
arrested, taken into custody and asked to
submit to a breathalyzer test. Nonetheless,
the court held that McAvoy was still not
entitled to Miranda advice because "[t]he
breath taken from [him] was physical evidence and was not testimonial within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination." Id. at 518,
551 A.2d at 879. This fifth amendment
protection "bars the State only from compelling 'communications' or 'testimony'.
Since a blood [or breath] test was 'physical
or real' evidence rather than testimonial ... " it is not protected. South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559. McAvoy therefore had no right to Miranda advice prior
to the breathalyzer test.
The court of appeals further dismissed
the argument that the officer's simple
request of McAvoy to take a chemical
sobriety test constituted an interrogation
within the meaning of Miranda. Id. at 518,
551 A.2d at 879. According to the identical
holding in Neville, supra., the police
inquiry "is highly regulated by state law,
and is presented in virtually the same
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